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3 April 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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Republic of the Congo



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Congo: [Congo] Congolese military leaders of both the Leopoldville and Stanleyville regimes met in the border area of Orientale and Equateur provinces near Bumba on 30 March to hold preliminary discussions concerning the Tananarive proposals for creating a loose confederation of Congolese states. At this meeting--probably planned by General Mobutu--it was decided that senior officers representing the two factions would meet separately in Leopoldville and Stanleyville on 6 April to arrive at a "general consensus," and that a joint meeting would be held at Lisala in Equateur Province on 10 April. Mobutu apparently hopes to attract support for a strong central government from among Gizenga's military leaders. While Gizenga has also opposed the Tananarive proposals, his military leaders are reportedly meeting with Mobutu's representatives without Gizenga's approval and have told Mobutu's representatives that they are dissatisfied with the civilian leadership in Stanleyville.]

Katanga's President Tshombé has denounced the airlifting of 800 Indian troops from Leopoldville to Kamina as a deliberate attempt by certain elements in the UN to prevent the formation of a confederation of states in the Congo. A UN official indicated that these troops would seek to interpose themselves between Tshombé's troops, which took Manono on 30 March, and Baluba tribesmen in northern Katanga who remain loyal to the Stanleyville regime. []

(Backup, Page 7) (Map)

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Communist China - Indonesia: Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia, which ended on 2

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April, outwardly restored the cordial Sino-Indonesian relations which existed before the outbreak in 1959 of the dispute over the Overseas Chinese. Friendship and cultural agreements were signed during the visit, and Chen expressed Peiping's readiness to resume its economic aid program, suspended in the summer of 1959. The difficulties between the two countries over the treatment of Chinese living in Indonesia were eased last December when Peiping agreed to a treaty under which it renounced its previous claim that Chinese living in Indonesia were still Chinese citizens. Under the treaty, local Chinese were required to choose within two years either Indonesian or Chinese citizenship. [REDACTED] 25X1

France-Algeria: The announcement on 1 April by the rebel provisional Algerian government (PAG) that it is still ready to negotiate with the French, provided formal talks are held only with its representatives, is an attempt to force further concessions from Paris. The French are claiming that negotiations will merely be postponed briefly. A top assistant to French Minister for Algeria Joxe on 1 April labeled the PAG's declarations a maneuver to get France to take a position on the PAG's claim to be the exclusive representatives of Algeria, and predicted that the rebels might try to draw the French into further secret preliminary talks. [REDACTED] 25X1

Portugal: On 28-29 March Minister of Defense Botelho Moniz, in a second approach to Premier Salazar this month, stressed again the urgency of reforms both in Portugal and in Portuguese policies in Africa--reforms which the military believe are essential. [REDACTED] 25X1

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[REDACTED] 25X1

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Situation in the Congo

The UN Command, which recently reinforced several garrisons in northern Katanga, hopes to arrange a cease-fire between the contending forces there. Clashes are reported to have occurred recently between the Katanga gendarmerie and Baluba tribesmen near Kabalo, about 100 miles north of Manono. A UN official stated that UN troops will attempt to prevent further advances by either side, but will use force only as a last resort.

Tshombé is particularly incensed over UN intervention in Katanga at this time; the presence of additional UN troops, besides posing a threat to future operations by his forces, might also adversely affect the already questionable loyalty of some of the tribal chiefs in the area. Concerned that some of these chiefs might be planning to withdraw from the Katanga "state" and form separate provinces, Tshombé is said to be planning a visit to the troubled areas in an attempt to dissuade them from taking this action.

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[Mobutu apparently feels that if the Lisala meeting is successful, he will be able to cope with any opposition to his plan. He is said to believe that if he moves troops into northern Katanga, he could pressure Tshombé--his principal opponent--into accepting a federal form of government. Mobutu reportedly is convinced that the UN Command would welcome his aid in "bringing Tshombé to heel" and that Tshombé's "Belgian mercenaries" would not oppose a unified army. In addition to the pressure Mobutu could exert on the Leopoldville politicians with a unified army, he believes he can also count on the support of Foreign Minister Bomboko and Interior Minister Adoula, who are known to share his opposition to a Congo confederacy.]

[Mobutu is less optimistic regarding a military arrangement with the Stanleyville faction. Although willing to compromise with General Lundula, Mobutu distrusts Gizenga, whom he considers "more dangerous than Lumumba." Nevertheless, he believes a unified army can be realized by removing Gizenga from power.]

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Sino-Indonesian Relations Outwardly Improved by Chen Yi's Visit

Peiping, which purports to be the protector of all Overseas Chinese, made strong representations on their behalf after Djakarta in 1959 ordered the closing of all stores owned by aliens (mostly Chinese) in rural areas. Chinese Communist Embassy personnel defied Indonesian restrictions by traveling through the countryside inciting local Chinese to resist Indonesian attempts to remove them.

Although it felt constrained to intervene in favor of the Overseas Chinese, Communist China was probably disturbed over the adverse effect its intransigent attitude toward Indonesia had on its carefully developed pose as a good neighbor. Peiping called off its propaganda attacks against Djakarta last August, and relations have been gradually improving since then.

Chinese economic assistance to Indonesia totaled \$48,000,-000 before relations became strained by the Overseas Chinese issue. A \$30,000,000 Chinese credit offered just before the outbreak of the dispute was never accepted by Indonesia. The planned visit of an Indonesian industrial mission to China later this month will provide an opportunity to discuss economic aid.

The Indonesian press was generally cordial to Chen Yi during his week's stay--apparently at the instigation of President Sukarno, who has been attempting to play down all other sources of international friction in order to focus attention on Indonesia's claim to Netherlands New Guinea. Nevertheless, Chinese-Indonesian relations are unlikely to be significantly affected. Foreign Minister Subandrio, still smarting from the treatment he received in Peiping in 1959, deliberately refrained from any welcoming remarks on Chen Yi's arrival at the Djakarta airport. The government restricted Chen's travels in

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Indonesia, and the length of his visit in the country was cut by two days.

Although the treaty of friendship declared that the two countries would "settle the issues in dispute through deliberations in the spirit of real friendship and good will through diplomatic channels and by other peaceful means," relations might again become embittered if Djakarta renews its attempts to remove Chinese from rural areas.

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[REDACTED]

Portuguese Defense Minister Urges Premier Salazar to Re-shuffle Cabinet

[In addition to Moniz' two oral approaches to Salazar, a letter drafted by Moniz and endorsed on 25 March by 17 key generals--including the heads of the security police and the Republican Guard--has been sent to the premier. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Moniz' letter pointed out Portugal's rapidly worsening position at home and abroad and emphasized that nothing was being done to halt this condition except an unproductive propaganda campaign against the UN and against those nations which disagree with Portuguese policy.]

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[Moniz stressed that Portugal faced the possibility of revolt in all its African provinces and Timor, as well as Indian "aggression" against Goa, and said the military felt they could not cope with a situation of such magnitude. After asserting that sweeping internal changes would be necessary to pave the way for essential constructive changes in foreign policy, the letter called on Salazar to revamp the cabinet completely and not just replace present ministers with "burned out" former ministers.]

[The letter reportedly was sent to Salazar without any ultimatum that he follow its recommendations or step down. If Salazar fails to act, however, the military would feel obliged to consider further action. Army Chief of Staff Camara Pina was the only participant in the 25 March meeting who failed to give his endorsement. It is said to have been under discussion by the military for some time, and was also approved by the former President, Marshal Craveiro Lopes.]

[Another approach to Salazar was made early in March by General Belezza Ferraz, chief of staff of the armed forces, who is close to Moniz. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the cabinet "remodeling" expected during the week of 20 March had been postponed because of the departure of the overseas minister for Angola on 23 March and the scheduled visit of French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville to Lisbon early in April.

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[REDACTED]

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